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EMPLOYER SANCTIONS FOR VIOLATION OF NO-STRIKE
CLAUSE: UNION BUSTING THROUGH MASS
DISCHARGE AND RESCISSION*
E PLOYERS often secure no-strike clauses 1 in collective bargaining contracts 2
with their employees' unions, 3 in order to ensure greater union responsibility
for the maintenance of stable production schedules.4 Under such clauses, the
union promises not to authorize or sanction any strike during the term of its
contract.' The employer is usually given power to discipline or discharge all
the individual union members who strike in violation of the no-strike clause.
0
*Marathon Electric Mfg. Corp., 106 N.L.R.B. No. 199, 32 LAD. REL. REF. MAN. 1645
(1953).
1. Approximately 89 percent of all collective bargaining contracts in the United
States contain some form of no-strike clause. Approximately nine out of ten of those
contracts without specific no-strike clauses provide for arbitration or grievance procednre
in disputes. BNA, CoLLF.cnW BARGAINING NEGOTIATIONS AND CONTRACTS 15:325 (1954)
(hereinafter cited as CBNC). Failure to employ arbitration or grievance procedures
before striking has been treated as if it were a no-strike violation. See NLRB v. Dorsey
Trailers, Inc., 179 F.2d 589 (5th Cir. 1950). A recent decision indicates that a no-strike
clause may have been written into every collective bargaining agreement by operation of
the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (hereinafter cited at LRMA), 61 STAT. 136
(1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (Supp. 1952). See Local No. 3, United Packinghouse
Workers of America, CIO v. NLRB, 210 F.2d 325, 332-3 (8th Cir. 1954).
Provisions against employer lockouts are included in approximately 74 percent of all
contracts. CBNC, mrpra at 15:325. Under many agreements, the prohibition against lock-
outs is not applicable when the union has violated the no-strike clause; the employer may
shut down pending assurances of no future violations. P-H LAB. ARD. SzEnv. ff 65,371.
2. In order to be binding upon a union, the no-strike clause must be incorporated
in the contract. A mere union pledge not to strike is not enforceable against a union.
Consolidated Frame Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 1295 (1950). See also 14 NLRB ANN. RP. 65
(1949).
3. A no-strike clause in an individual employment contract is illegal on the theory
that such a clause deprives a worker of his statutory right to strike. Cf. Berkshire
Knitting Mills, 46 N.L.RB. 955, 1006 (1943). See also cases cited P-H LAD. RX. Sunv. V
20,791.1(5) (1954). However, this theory has not been maintained in collective contracts;
an employer is allowed to insist upon a no-strike clause. See N.L.R.B. v. Norfolk Ship-
building and Drydock Co., 195 F.2d 632 (4th Cir. 1952). But cf. N.L.R.B. v. Tower
Hosiery Mills, Inc., 180 F.2d 701 (4th Cir. 1950) (insistence upon overly stringent
no-strike clause used as evidence of intent to refuse to bargain).
4. For discussion of the purpose of no-strike clauses, see, generally, SMITH, LAnU0,
LAWS, CASES AND MATERIALS 770 (2d ed. 1953) ; 1952 Report of the Committee on It-
provement of Administration of Union-Employer Contracts, Section of Labor Relations
Law, American Bar Association, Tire No-Strike Clause (hereinafter cited as ABA Re-
port), 21 Gzo. WASH. L. REv. 127, 128 (1952) ; Daykin, The No-Strikc Clause, 11 U. oir
PiTr. L. Rzv. 13, 13-14 (1949).
5. The extent to which the no-strike clause is applicable varies in different contracts,
These may be divided generally into two categories: unconditional and conditional. Un-
conditional clauses are unequivocal abridgements of the right to strike. Forty percent
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When confronted with a union-sponsored strike in violation of a no-strike
clause, the employer may be forced to accede to the union's demands because
of production requirements or the scarcity of replacement workers. 7 Alterna-
tively, he may shut down his plant and wait out the strike, disciplining the
strikers when they return to work, subject to an arbitrator's review.8 How-
ever, if he believes his bargaining position to be strong, he may discharge all
the strikers, rescind the contract, and refuse thereafter to deal with the union.0
The National Labor Relations Board has upheld such employer actions on the
grounds that they are justified by the union's prior material breach of the
contract,' ° and that strikers in violation of contract are not protected by the
National Labor Relations Act."1
of contracts contain such clauses. CBNC, supra note 1, at 15:326. Conditional clawes
abridge the general right to strike but retain it in certain circumstances (e.g., upon C-
haustion of the grievance procedure, or upon a majority vote of the union membrrship),
or upon certain issues (e.g., wage reopener disputes, or work load changes). For examples
of different types of no-strike clauses, see CBNC, supra note 1, at 77:1-904.
6. -The penalty provisions of many no-strike clauses dclare that violators are subject
to discipline or discharge. CBNC, supra note 1, at 15:323. Some provide fur sptecific
penalties of a lesser-than-discharge nature. Ibid. For general discussion see P-H Ur,
CoNT. Stav. f1[1 53,402-3 (1954). For specific types of lesser-than-discharge penalties, see
note 72 infra.
The union normally exempts itself by contract from liability arising from unauthorized
strikes. ABA Report, 21 GEo. 1VASH. L. RE. 127, 146-151 (1952). Howkver, some cvn-
tracts call for sanctions against the union for unauthorized n,-strike violations, if the
union fails to take specific steps to end the strike. CBNC, supra nute 1, at 77:275 ct seq.
Cf. United Elastic Corp., 34 N.L.R.B. 763 (1949) (union made responsible by Board for
failure to disavow wildcat walkout).
7. An employer who agrees unconditionally to reinstate no-strike violators is blund
to this decision on the theory that he has waived his right to enfurce p.naities. Alabama
Marble Co., S3 N.L.R.B. 1047 (1949), enforced, 185 F.2d 1022 (5th Cir. 1951); Carey
Salt Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 1099 (1946); Columbia Pictures Corp., 82 N.L.R.B. 563 (1949).
But cf. Fafnir Bearing Co., 73 N.L.R.B. 1003 (1947) (employer could refuse to reemploy
union leaders after offer of reinstatement). However, a conditional offer of reinstate-
ment does not constitute a waiver unless the striking employees fulfill the specified
conditions. United Elastic Corp., 84 N.L.R.B. 763 (1949) (time limitation placed upon
reinstatement offer). The conditions may not be discriminatory. Eagle-Picher Mining
& Smelting Co., 119 F.2d 903 (8th Cir. 1941).
8. See text at notes 41-2 infra.
9. See, e.g., Boeing Airplane Co. v. NLRB, 174 F.2d 9s (D.C. Cir. 1949) (resc&ssion
and mass discharge) ; Marathon Electric Mfg. Co., 106 N.L.R.B. No. 199, 32 LAP. Rx..
REF. MAN. 1645 (1953) (mass discharge, rescission, refusal to bargain) ; United Elastic
Corp., 84 N.L.R.B. 763 (1949) (rescission, refusal to bargain, mass discharge).
10. See Boeing Airplane Co. v. NLRB, 174 F.2d 933 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (rescis ;on
permitted without discussion) ; Marathon Electric Mfg. Corp., 106 N.L.R.B. No. 199, 32
LAB. REL. REP. MAN. 1645 (1953) (same). But cf. United Elastic Corp., 84 N.LR.B.
768 (1949) (rescission termed irrelevant).
11. 49 STAT. 452 (1935) as amended, 61 SrT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 et scq.
(Supp. 1952) (hereinafter cited as NLRA or Act). The doctrine that contract violatrs
are not protected by the Act was first handed down in NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 30G
U.S. 332 (1939), and has been followed consistently by the Board. See, e.j., Scullin btL
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The recent case of Marathon Electric Manufacturing Corp."- involved the
latter type of employer sanctions. A dispute arose concerning interpretation
of the collective bargaining agreement.13 Upon the breakdown of negotiations,
the leadership of the United Electrical Workers local violated the no-strike
clause by calling the entire first shift out of the plant to attend a union meet-
ing.14 Marathon immediately locked the gates, thereby denying admittance to
second and third shift workers.' 5 The next day it sent a letter purporting to
discharge, under the no-strike clause, all "participants" in the strike,10 and
a week later it rescinded the contract with UE.17 Three weeks after the start
of the strike, the company reopened the plant,' 8 and began to hire a sub-
stantially new working force.19 A different union, assisted by the management
in organizing the newly hired employees, was then granted recognition.20
UE appealed to the NLRB,21 alleging that Marathan had discriminated
against the union by its mass discharge and rescission, violating Sections
Co., 65 N.L.R.B. 1294 (1946); Joseph Dyson & Sons, Inc. 72 N.L.R.B. 445 (1947);
National Electric Products Corp., 80 N.L.R.B. 995 (1948). Exceptions to the general rule
are the cases where the employer has waived the right to penalize, see note 7 supra, and
where the strike has been precipitated by the employer's unfair labor practice, see note
67 infra.
12. 106 N.L.R.B. No. 199, 32 LAR. REL. REF. MAN. 1645 (1953).
13. The disputed issue was a wage increase which had been rejected by the Wage
Stabilization Board. UE demanded the increase in fringe benefits, and Marathon refused.
Communication to the YALE LAW JOLMYRAL from Calvin 0. Crocker, Labor Relations
Director, Marathon Electric Mfg. Corp., dated May 17, 1954, in Yale Law Library.
14. The walkout occurred at 2:00 P.M. on February 28, 1952. Marathon Electric
Mfg. Corp., 106 N.L.R.B. No. 199, p. 3, 32 LAD. REL. REF. MAN. 1645, 1646 (1953). The
no-strike clause provided, in part: ".... the union will not authorize or sanction any strike
... and the Company will not lock out the employees .... In case any such action . . .
shall occur . . . any or all of the employees taking part will be subject to discipline or
discharge." Id. at 2, 32 LAB. RE.. REF. MAN. at 1646.
15. The plant was completely shut down by 2:40 P.M. the same day. Id. at 3, 32
LAD. REL REF. MAN. at 1646.
16. Id. at 4, 32 LAB. REL. REF. MAN. at 1646.
17. The rescission was announced by letter to all employees on March 5, 1952. Ibid.
In addition, Marathon discharged four UE members who had remained on the job as
watchmen after the walkout and two non-union office workers whose husbands were
members of UE. Id. at 4-5, 32 LAB. REL. REF. MAN. at 1648, 1650.
18. Id. at 5, 32 LAB. RFL.. REF. MAN. at 1650.
19. Only 49 UE members were rehired by Marathon out of a normal working force
of 450-550. Communcation to the YALE LAW JOURNAL from Calvin 0. Crocker, Labor
Relations Director, Marathon Electric Mfg. Corp., dated May 17, 1954, in Yale Law
Library. It took a substantial period of time for Marathon to hire its new working force:
two weeks after it reopened the plant, it was operating with only 39 workers; and twelve
weeks after reopening it was employing only 115 workers. Marathon Electric Mfg. Co.,
106 N.L.R.B. No. 199, pp. 5, 6, 32 LAB. REL REF. MAN. 1645, 1650, 1651 (1953).
20. A local of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL, (IBEW)
was recognized by the employer as the employees' bargaining agent on June 9, 1952. Ibid.
21. The General Counsel of the NLRB assumed the burden of UE's case under
NLRB procedure. See 29 ConE FED. REs. §§ 101.8, 101.10, 101.11(b) (1949).
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8(a) (1) and 8(a) (3) of the Act.2 2 Its theory was that the strike had ended
on the day of the walkout when the union leaders ordered the men back to
work, so that Marathon's refusal to admit the employees who subsequently
appeared at the plant gates constituted a lockout.2 The union demanded rein-
statement of the workers who had been denied admittance and of the laid-off
workers who had been denied recall because of the rescission.2 - It also asked
for resumption of its bargaining rights.2
The Board, however, considering each employer action separately, ruled gen-
erally for M1arathon. Since UE had never unequivocally informed Marathon that
the walkout had ended,26 the Board held that the company could assume that
it was continuing and therefore did not have to bargain with the union.2 7 The
Board stated that the appearance of the workers at the plant gates on the
day of the walkout was merely a "tactical maneuver."2 8 Moreover, it found
22. Section 8(a) (1) provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer
to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
in Section 7 of this title." (Section 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1946), guarantees employees
the right of self-organization).
Section 8(a) (3) provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer
by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of
employment to encourage or discourage membership in a labor organization." 49 Sr, T.
452 (1935), as amended, 61 STAT. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (Supp. 1952).
For specific contentions of General Counsel, see Marathon Electric Mfg. Corp. 106
N.L.R.B. No. 199, pp. 8-14, 32 LA.& REt. Rr. MAN. 1645, 1647-9 (1953).
23. Id. at 13, 32 LB. RE.. REr. MAN. at 1649. An employer who shuts down his
operations or prevents his employees from working in order to affect their choice of union
or to avoid bargaining with a union is guilty of discrimination in violation of §§ 8(a) (1)
and 8(a) (3). See note 22 supra. NLRB v. Somerset Classics, Inc., 193 F2d 613 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied sub ior. Modern Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 344 U.S. 816 (1952) ; NLRB v. Stremcl,
141 F.2d 317 (10th Cir. 1944). See also cases cited in P-H L.%. Rr.j Sunv. T 21,133 (1954).
And see Comment, Legallty of Employer's Use of Lockout, 51 Micr. L. REv. 419 (1953).
A shutdown in the face of a strike is not always discriminatory. See note 29 infra.
24. Marathon Electric Mfg. Corp., 106 N.L.R.B., No. 199, pp. 9, 11, 32 Lan. R,%D .rP .
M.. 1645, 1647, 1648 (1953). The General Counsel conceded that the workers on the
first shift who had walked out were not entitled to protection. Id. at p. 7, 32 L.r,. Rn..
REF. I.AN. at 1647.
25. Id. at 14,32 LAB. REr REF. MAN. at 1650. UE's theory .was that if the 62 absentees
and 105 laid-off employees were reinstated, Marathon would be required by law to bargain
with UE.
26. The Board felt that UE had not stated that the strike was ended, but rather had
stated its wish to negotiate concerning its end. Id. at 14, 32 L"n. Rn . REF..MA::. at 1649.
27. Employers generally are under a duty to bargain with their employees' union
during a strike. See cases cited in P-H LAB. R.. Smv. 11 21,972 (1954). However, if
the strike is in violation of contract, there is no duty to bargain until the strike is terminated.
See, e.g., Higgins, Inc., 90 N.L.R.B. 184 (1950); United Elastic Corp., 84 N.LR.B. 76S
(1949).
28. Marathon Electric Mfg. Corp., 106 N.L.R.B. No. 199, p. 10, 32 Lin. REx.. RE-.
MAN. 1645, 1648 (1953). The Board found this a "tactical maneuver" because the LIE
leadership did not order the men back until after it learned that the gates were closed.
It also referred to a similar instance in a previous UE strike. UE had conducted strikes
at Marathon in 1941 and 1946. Communication to the YALE LAw JouRuAL from Calvin
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economic justification for shutting down the plant during the strike. 29 Because
the union itself was responsible for the strike and because no workers "dis-
associated" themselves from the union's actions, the Board held that Marathon
could discharge the entire union membership as strikers in violation of con-
tract.30 Those who were validly discharged under this rationale included
absentees and second and third shift workers who were "fortuitously" not
present in the plant at the time of the walkout.31 The Board further held that
UE's prior breach of the contract enabled Marathan to rescind it,82 thereby
denying to the 105 previously laid-off workers whatever seniority rights and
rehiring priorities they possessed.8 3
0. Crocker, Labor Relations Director, Marathon Electric Mfg. Corp., dated May 17,
1954, in Yale Law Library.
29. Marathon Electric Mfg. Corp. 106 N.L.R.B. No. 199, p. 8, 32 LAI;. REL. REV. MAN.
1645, 1647 (1953). The shutdown was economically justified because the employer did
not know how long the walkout would last; and the second and third shifts merely
serviced and supplied parts to the first shift, making it economically wasteful to continue
production, without the first shift. Id. at p. 8, 32 LAB. Rm. REF. MAN. at 1647. For other
examples of economically justified shutdowns, see International Shoe Co., 93 N.LR.B. 907
(1951) (shutdown of integrated plant justified when two departments struck) ; Duluth
Bottling Association, 48 N.L.R.B. 1335 (1943) (shutdown justified because of anticipated
spoilage). See also Comment, Legality of Employers' Use of Lockout, 51 Micu. L. REv.
419 (1953); 22 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 248 (1953). Some courts feel that a lockout is a
legal device for use in any strike situation. See Morand Bros. Beverage Co. v. NLRB 204
F.2d 529, 534 (7th Cir. 1953).
30. The Board based its finding of no express disassociation on the fact that Marathon's
"employees . . .were members of a strong and militant local . .. tuider a [union shop]
contract .... [T]he walkout ... received the complete support of the employees who were
in the plant at the time it took place. The record is silent as to any showing of dissent
among these [non-present] employees. . . ." Marathon Electric Mfg. Corp., 106 N.L.R.B.
No. 199, p. 9, 32 LAB. RE.. REF. MAN. 1645, 1647 (1953).
The Bureau of National Affairs stated that the Board found "constructive participation"
by the non-present workers. 32 BNA, LAB. REL. REF. MAN. ANAL 93 (1953). It
further felt that the militancy, union shop, and "tactical maneuver" were limitations to
the future application of Marathon. Ibid. See also 22 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 248 (1953)
for criticism of this phase of the decision as placing excessive responsibility upon indi-
viduals for the union's acts.
31. There were 62 employees in this category, Marathon Electric Mfg. Corp, 100
N.L.R.B. No. 199, p. 9, 32 LAB. REL. REF. MAN. 1645, 1647 (1953). They constituted
approximately 12 percent of the work force. Id. at pp. 2, 9, 32 LAB. REL. RE. MAN. at
1646, 1647.
32. Id. at 11, 32 LAB. REL. REF. MAN. at 1650.
33. The rescinded contract granted to these employees first priority to fill any vacan-
cies at Marathon. Marathon Electric Mfg. Corp. 106 N.L.R.B. No. 199, p. 4, 32 LAB.
REL. REF. MAN. 1645, 1648 (1953).
The Board ruled against Marathon in these respects: it ordered reinstatement with
back pay for four watchmen and two office employees who had been discriminatorily
discharged because of their union membership. Id. at 7, 12, 19, 32 LAB. RFL, R~Xp, MAN.
at 1648-9. It further revoked the recognition given IBEW, see note 20 supra, on the theory
that no substantial and representative working force existed at the time the union was
recognized, id. at p. 15, 32 LAB. REL. REF. MAN. at 1650, following the rule established
in Coast Pacific Lumber Co., 78 N.L.R.B. 1245 (1948). However, IBEW was soon validly
certified as bargaining agent for the employees. See note 38 infra.
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NOTES
The NLRB has consistently denied the employer the right to affect, by
employment or discharge, his employees' choice of union.3 4 Occasional dis-
charge penalties for no-strike violations admittedly serve as deterrents to
future strikes.35 Moreover, discharge is explicitly authorized by many con-
tracts incorporating no-strike clauses and therefore is a justifiable disciplinary
measure.30 And Section 8(d) of the NLRA may be construed to allow the
employer to treat no-strike violators as having forfeited their rights as em-
ployees under the Act.37 But in Marathon, by permitting a mass discharge
followed by contract rescission and refusal to bargain, the Board enabled the
company permanently to oust the striking union as bargaining agent for its
employees.-3 Since Marathan followed its discharge notice with an offer to
rehire the discharged workers,3 9 its aim in effecting the mass discharge was
not primarily to discipline individual strikers but to oust the union. Its other
actions, considered together, support this conclusion:'
34. Section 8(a)(3) clearly states this policy. See note 22 supra. The questions
concerning application of § 8(a) (3) have therefore dealt primarily with the trool of
discrimination rather than the principle. See cases cited P-H LAD. RE.. Sunv. V 21,125,
21,134, 21,135 (1954).
35. See ABA Report, 21 GEo. WAsH. L. R . 127, 172 (1952).
36. See note 6 supra.
37. Section 8(d), 61 STAT. 142, 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 15S (Supp. 1952), outlines the
procedure under which a union may strike for termination or modification of a collcetive
bargaining contract. The concluding paragraph of the section states: "Any employee
who engages in a strike [in violation of this section] shall lose his status as an employee
... for the purposes of sections" 8-10 of the NL RA. Whbile it can be argued that UE's
walkout in Marathon does not fall within the contemplation of this section because it
concerned interpretation of the contract rather than its modification, other cases have con-
sidered interpretation strikes within the purview of § 8(d). See Wagner Iron Works,
104 N.LR.B. No. 62, 32 L.. Ru. REr. MAN. 1104, 1103 (1953) ; Mastro Plastics Corp.,
103 N.L.R.B. 511, 517 (1953); H.N. Thayer Co., 99 N.L.R.B. 1122, 1132 (1952). The
Board in Marathon Electric Mfg. Corp., 106 N.L.R.B. No. 199, 32 1-%. IR.L REF. M:.
1645 (1953), made passing mention of UE's non-compliance with § 8(d). Id. at 3, 32 L.,n.
REXr.. REF. MAx. at 1646.
38. Although the Board invalidated the recognition granted by Marathon to IBEW, see
note 33 supra, IBEW was certified as bargaining agent for Marathon employees on
February 2, 1954 after an election was held. Communication to the Ym.n LAw Jounz;AL
from Calvin 0. Crocker, Labor Relations Director, Marathon Electric Mfg. Corp., dated
May 17, 1954, in Yale Law Library.
39. Marathon Electric Mfg. Corp., 106 N.L.R.B. No. 199, p. 4,32 LAn. Ri. REF. MM:.
1645, 1647 (1953). While the offer to rehire was conditional upon a return as new employees,
with loss of accrued benefits, the tone of the letter was apologetic: "You [the discharged
employees] should know that, unfortzmatcly, this union action forces us to consider
everyone who is rehired as new employees." Ibid. (emphasis supplied). The workers who
accepted Marathon's offer were in fact restored to full seniority. Communication to the
Yuxs LAw Joutaxzu. from Calvin 0. Crocker, Labor Relations Director, Marathon Electric
Mfg. Corp., dated May 17, 1954, in Yale Law Library.
40. These actions included the discriminatory discharge of si: employees because
of UE membership, see note 33 supra; the rescission of UE's contract, see text at notes
46-56 infra; and active solicitation of a new union, see text at notes 57-C0 infra.
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An employer desiring to invoke sanctions against an unlawful union-spon-
sored walkout is not forced to discharge the strikers and rescind the contract:
he has the option of continuing the contract and submitting his disciplinary
measures to arbitration. 41 Arbitrators, who must consider a continuing labor-
management relationship as well as responsibility for individual violations,
usually allow discharge only of the leaders and instigators of an unlawful
walkout.42 The Board itself has approved this type of employer sanction.43
The NLRB will not, however, invalidate employer disciplinary measures, re-
gardless of harshness, unless they discriminate against workers because of
union membership.44 And the Board is clearly under no obligation to apply
arbitrators' standards as to the reasonableness of employer discipline. But
when employer measures such as mass discharge go far beyond normal dis-
ciplinary requirements, the Board might well consider them as evidence of
discrimination. 4
5
41. About 89 percent of all collective bargaining agreements contain provisions calling
for arbitration between the parties. BNA, CoLL~cnrvE BARGAINING NEGOTIATIONS AND
CONTRACTS 15:130 (1954). The procedure is initiated on an appeal by the union from the
employer's determinations. Some contracts, however, allow no appeal, or an appeal
only upon the issue of participation and not upon the penalty invoked. Id. at 15:328-9.
While, at common law, contracts to arbitrate cannot be specifically enforced, see
STURGES, Com ALCiJ ARBIAnTIONS AND AwARDS, 45 (1930), several courts have con-
strued Section 301 of the LRMA, 61 STAT. 156, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (Supp. 1952), as allowing
a union to compel the employer to arbitrate an unauthorized walkout if there is a contract
to arbitrate. Textile Workers Union of America v. American Thread Co., 113 F. Supp. 137
(D. Mass. 1953); Textile Workers Union of America v. Alco Mfg. Co,, 94 F. Supp. 626
(M.D.N.C. 1950). See discussion in ABA Report, 21 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 127, 134-43
(1952).
42. See, e.g., Swift & Co., 12 LAB. ARD. REP. 108 (1948) ; Gloucester Fisheries, 5 LAB.
AB. REP. 466 (1946) ; Bethlehem Steel Co., 2 LAB. ARB. REP. 194 (1945).
See, generally, ABA Report, 21 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 127, 157-70 (1952); Daykiln,
The No-Strike Clause, 11 U. OF PiTT. L. REv. 13, 18-34 (1949) ; P-H UNION CONT. SraV.
fr 53,402 for discussion of arbitrators' handling of problems relevant to no-strike violations.
See also cases cited in P-H LAB. ARB. SERv. gf 65,351-71.4 (1954).
43. See Fafnir Bearing Co., 73 N.L.R.B. 1008 (1947). There the employer uncon-
ditionally offered to reinstate all workers who struck in violation of contract and thereby
was held to have waived his rights under the no-strike clause. See note 8 supra. When the
workers returned, the employer refused to reinstate the union leaders and several other
workers. The court held that the union leaders could be validly discharged but all other
workers were covered by the waiver. Cf. NLRB v. E.A. Laboratories, Inc., 188 F.2d 885
(2d Cir. 1951); NLRB v. Dorsey Trailers, Inc., 179 F.2d 589 (5th Cir. 1950) (employer
justified in discharging only union leaders).
44. "Al employer may discharge an employee for a good reason, a poor reason or
no reason at all so long as the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act are not
violated." Edw. G. Budd Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 138 F.2d 86, 90 (3d Cir. 1943). Accord:
Wyman-Gordon Co., v. NLRB, 153 F.2d 480 (7th Cir. 1946); American Smelting and
Refining Co. v..NLRB, 126 F.2d 680 (8th Cir. 1942). See cases cited in P-H LAB. Ru.
SEv. gff 21,201--81 (1954).
45. The Board has considered excessive severity as evidence of discrimination against
individuals. See, e.g., McCann Steel Co., 106 N.L.R.B. No. 6, 32 LAD. Riu. REP. MAN. 1398
(1953) ; Precast Slab & Tile Co., 88 N.L.R.B. 1237 (1950) ; but cf. Wyman-Gordon Co.,
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The Board's validation of Marathon's contract rescission also appears un-
sound. In collective bargaining contracts, where a large number of minor
violations are within the expectation of both parties,40 rescission is not justified
by every breach of contract. 47 However, there is precedent stating that a
"material breach" by one party to a collective bargaining agreement enables
the other party to rescind the contract.48 Material breach by the union would
probably be effected by a strike of substantial size and duration9 and might be
effected by a concerted slowdovn. ' O In Marathon, UE had been bargaining
agent since 1937, and the violation occurred after seven months of a one-year
contract.r' The UE members walked out to attend a union meeting, not to
strike;52 and even though Marathon might not have been expressly informed
153 F.2d 480 (7th Cir. 1946) (court felt employee's conduct justified severe penalty).
See also cases cited P-H Lx. R.. SEnv. €[ 21,361 (1954).
46. The presence of grievance procedures in almost all contracts, see note 1 sitpra,
is an acknowledgement of the fact that contract violations are expected. See ALA Report,
21 GFo. WAsH. L. Rzv. 127, 159 (1952).
47. See Boeing Airplane Co. v. International Association of Machinists, 91 F. Supp. 59,
608-9 (W.D. Wash. 1950); Kennedy v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 25 N.J. Super 601,
607, 96 A2d 720, 723 (1953). Cf. Textile Workers Union of America v. Alco Mfg. Co.,
94 F. Supp. 626 (M.D.N.C. 1950) (unauthorized strike did not relieve employer of obliga-
tion to arbitrate).
4S. The history of unilateral rescission in labor relations situations is surprisingly
limited. Marathon represents only the third case in which the problem has appeared before
the Board. In Boeing Airplane Co., 80 N.L.R.B. 447 (1948), the Beard avoided the
rescission problem by finding that the contract had expired prior to the strilce. However,
the Court of Appeals found the contract still in effect, and upheld the employer's rescission.
NLRB v. Boeing Airplane Co., 174 F2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1949). In United Elastic Corp.,
84 N.L.R.B. 768 (1949), the Board, in allowing a mass discharge, e-;pressly refused to
rule on the validity of the employer's rescission. Id. at 774 n.13. In a suit under Section
301 of the LRMA growing out of the no-strike violation in NLRB v. Boeing Airplane
Co., supra, the court without discussion found a material breach by the union. Therefore it
held the employer's rescission w:as valid and a bar to his recovery in damages. Boeing Air-
plane Co. v. International Association of Machinists, 91 F. Supp. 596 (W.D. Wash. 1950),
aff'd, 188 F.2d 356 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 821 (1951).
Three state courts have recognized the right of an employer unilaterally to rescind
a collective bargaining agreement. See Crandell v. Thrifty Drug Stores Co., 5 CCH
LAB. CAs. ff 60,846 (Calif. Sup. Ct. 1941) ; Zaritsky v. Lish, 95 N.Y.LJ. 346 (Sup. Ct.
Jan. 20, 1936) ; see Kennedy v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. 25 N.J. Super. 691, 607, 96
A.2d 720, 723, rev'd on other grounds, 29 N.J. Super. 6., 101 A2d 592 (1953).
49. See Crandell v. Thrifty Drug Stores Co., 5 CCH LAD. CAs. €I 60,846 (Calif. Sup.
Ct. 1941) ; Zaritsky v. Lish, N.Y.L.J. 346 (Sup. Ct. Jan. 20, 1936). Some contracts specify
a strike of substantial duration beforc rescission becomes available as a remedy to the
employer. See, e.g., Agreement between Bendix Aviation Corp. and UAW-CIO (1950)
(strike must last 10 days); Agreement between General Motors Corp. and UAW-CIO
(1948) (same).
50. See Kennedy v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 25 N.J. Super. 601, ¢05, 96 A.2d 720,
723, rez'd on other grounds, 29 N.J. Super. 68, 101 A.2d 592 (App. Div. 1953).
51. Communication to the Y.%LE LAw JotrRxaL from Calvin 0. Crocker, Labor Rela-
tions Director, Marathon Electric Mfg. Corp., dated May 17, 1954, in Yale Law Library.
52. Marathon Electric 'Mfg. Corp., 10L6 N.L.R.B. No. 199, p. 7,32 Lu%. Rn.._ Rr.F. MAN.
1645, 1647 (1953). This work stoppage violated UE's no-strike clause as much as a formal
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that the walkout was over, a majority of union workers appeared at the plant
gates the next day, five days before Marathon's rescission. 3 Granting that the
walkout constituted a breach of contract subjecting the union members to
discipline,54 it is at least questionable whether the breach was sufficiently
material to justify rescission.55 Yet the board did not discuss this issue5
Moreover, the Board should have considered Marathon's contract rescission
not as an independent act but as one step in a co-ordinated plan to oust UE
as bargaining agent. The rescission, following the mass discharge, enabled
Marathon to -hire a substantially new working force, without having to rehire
a nucleus of laid-off UE workers under the contract."7 By virtue of the res-
cission, the newly hired workers were not bound to UE under the old con-
tract.58 And Marathon's refusal to bargain with UE after the rescission was
strike would have. Ibid. However, the reasons why the workers left the plant bear upon
the materiality of the union's breach.
53. Ibid.
54. See note 52 supra.
55. There has been no discussion of what factors constitute a material breach of a
collective bargaining agreement. See note 48 supra. Moreover, in the analogous field of
continuing performance contracts, there is no clear delineation of material breach. Com-
mentators have concluded merely that a material breach is one that goes to the heart
of a contract and enables the other party to rescind, while an immaterial breach is an in-
substantial or technical one which may be adequately compensated for by damages, See
SimPsoN, CONTRACTS § 154 (1954) ; WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 841 (Rev'd Ed. 1936).
However, there is support for holding that UE's breach in Marathon was not sufficiently
material to justify rescission. The appearance of the workers at the plant gate and the
union's desire to negotiate concerning the end of the walkout might be construed as
evincing a desire to be bound by the contract after a walkout of only a single day. See,
e.g., Pasquel v. Owen, 186 F.2d 263 (8th Cir. 1950) (in baseball player-manager's five-year
contract, termination of his managership duties by employer did not justify rescission by
player when employer had not refused to be bound by the contract in the future) ; Para-
mount Pictures, Inc. v. Maxon, 226 Iowa 308, 284 N.W. 119 (1939) (in one-year movie
supply contract, failure of supplier to furnish one movie of two days' run did not justify
rescission by exhibitor). But cf. Nickel v. Pollia, 179 F.2d 160 (10th Cir. 1950) (con-
tractor's rescission justified when subcontractor stopped work pending settlement of disputes
between the parties). The Board also neglected to consider whether the employer's mass
discharge under the penalty provisions of the contract, see text at note 16 supra, was an
affirmance of the contract subsequent to the breach. Affirmance generally will bar re-
scission. See BLACK, RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION §§ 594-5 (2d Ed. 1929). But c/.
Boeing Airplane Co. v. NLRB, 174 F.2d 988 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (simultaneous discharges
and rescission upheld); United Elastic Corp., 84 N.L.R.B. 768 (1949) (discharges upheld
after rescission).
56. It may be argued that the undiluted principles of contract law should not apply
to a collective bargaining agreement, which presupposes a continuing relationship between
employer and union and an absence of real economic alternatives for either party. See
Chamberlain, Collective Bargaining and the Concept of Contract, 48 COL. L. Rv. 829
(1948); Witmer, Collective Labor Agreements in the Courts 48 YALE L.J. 194, 209-10
(1938).
57. See text at note 33 supra.
58. If the old contract remained in effect, its union shop provisions, see note 30




followed by its active solicitation of another union during the rehiring periodP
For a material violation of its contract, a union should perhaps be chastised
by recission, which may allow an employer to renegotiate the essential terms
of the contract to his advantage. But if, as in Marathon, rescission is designed
not to discipline the union but to enable the employer illegally to assist in the
development of a new union, ° it should be disallowed.
The tactic of mass discharge and contract rescission condoned by the Board
in Marathon works severe hardship upon individual union members. It places
all union members, regardless of participation or leadership in the strike, at
the mercy of the employer as to the terms of re-employment: he may refuse
to rehire any members of the striking union 6x or he may rehire them only
with loss of seniority rights and accrued benefits. 2 loreover, the rescission
prevents the employees from testing the materiality of their union's breach and
the validity of their own discharges through the grievance procedures.'P
The only way, apparently, for the individual to escape penalties is by disasso-
ciation from the union's illegal acts.64 But it is unrealistic to expect this action
59. See text at note 20 supra.
60. The support and solicitation of IBEW by Marathon w.as rightly considered a
violation of Section 8(a) (2) of the NLRA which prohibits an employer from d,minativg
or interfering with the formation of a labor union. 49 STAT. 452 (1935), as an:cndcd, 61
STAT. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (Supp. 1952). See cases cited in P-H Ln. R .. Srnv.
f 20,911-21,011 (1954). Despite the Board's invalidation of IBEW's recognition, that
union was soon validly certified as bargaining agent for Marathmn employees. See note
38 supra.
61. In M1arathon, the company rehired only 49 out of 5"0 discharged UE memLr.
Communication to the YI.uE LAW JotRn.L from Calvin 0. Crocker, Labor Relations Di-
rector, Marathon Electric Mfg. Corp., dated .lay 17, 1954, in Yale Law Lilrry. Its a;lity
to hire a substantially new working force probably resulted from the small .-ie of its plant
and a depressed employment market. In the normal case, the employer must rehire most
of the strikers in order to reopen. See United Elastic Corp., 84 N.L.R.B. 76S (1949)
(employer made two unsuccessful offers of reinstatement before discharging stri!:ing
workers); Fafnir Bearing Co., 73 N.L.RB. 1003 (1947) (employer reibtatad entire work
force two months after commencement of illegal strike).
62. NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332, 345 (1939) (enipluyLr c tld offer re-
employment at different terms to validly discharged employees) ; United Elastic Corp., 84
N.L.R.B. 768, 777 (1949) (employer justified in rehiring some di&charg,' workers and
refusing to rehire others) ; Scullin Steel Co., 65 N.L.R.D. 1294, 1318 (1945) (employer
justified in refusing reinstatement to all discharged strikers). 22 GEo. Wxsn. L RE%. 243
(1953) suggests that Marathon may allow the employer to place w.hat in other circum-
stances would be illegal conditions upon the rehiring of discharged workers: loss of senior-
ity and abandonment of UE. Sce Wilson & Co. v. NLRB, 120 F.2d 913, 924 (7th Cir.
1941).
63. If the contract had remained effective, Marathon's penalties would have &:en
reviewed by an arbitrator. See Brief for General Counsel, p. 19, Marathon Electric
Mfg. Corp., 106 N.L.R.B. No. 199, 32 LAB. REt. Rr. MAn:. 1645 (1953). While the
NLRB did review the penalties, an arbitrator would probably have disallowed the mas
discharge. See text at note 42 supra.
64. Marathon Electric Mfg. Corp., 106 N.L.R.B. No. 199, 32 LAB. Ra. Rra.. M.'x.
1645 (1953). See note 30 supra. Cf. Polih National Alliance v. NLRB, 136 F.2d 175,
181 (7th Cir. 1943) (worker who disassociated himself from the rest of unfair lahir
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in a union with any internal solidarity."5 And the requirement of disassociation
runs counter to federal labor legislation, which encourages collective activity
through unions. 60 It is particularly unreasonable to expect an individual mem-
ber to disassociate himself from his union when there is a chance that the
union may be justified in its actions.0 7 The issues surrounding the legality
of a strike are usually clouded at the time of the strike, and participation by
union members is usually based upon information given by the union leader-
ship and acquiescence in leadership maneuvers.0 8
Invalidation of mass discharge and rescission in a situation such as Mara-
thon does not unduly limit the employer. He may refuse to bargain with the
union until the strike is terminated. 9 He may hire new workers during the
strike and need not reinstate workers whose jobs have been filled.7 I-Ie
may discipline strike leaders by discharge 71 and strike participants by reason-
able lesser-than-discharge penalties.7 2 And he has the opportunity of calling
for a new representation election if he believes that the striking union has lost
practice strikers given back pay from day of disassociation and application for reinstate-
ment); Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 107 N.L.R.B. No. 301, 33 LAD. REL. REF. MAN. 1433,
1436 (1954) (employer did not lock out non-striking employees who had not disassociated
themselves from union's strike).
65. In Marathon, none of the 62 absentees took any steps to disassociate himself from
the union, and 9 out of 11 polled UE workers stated they would not have accepted any
offer of reinstatement which did not include all 6ther members of the local. Marathon
Electric Mfg. Corp., 106 N.L.R.B. No. 199, p. 10, 32 LAB. REF. MAN. 1645, 1647-8 (1953).
66. Section 1, NLRA, 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1946) ; see statement of
Senator Taft in HARTLEY, OUR NEW NATIONAL LABOR POLICY, p. xiv (1948).
67. If a no-strike violation has been precipitated by the employer's unfair labor
practice, it is the Board's rule to condone the violation and order reinstatement of all
discharged workers. Mastro Plastic Co., 103 N.L.R.B. 511 (1953). See Joseph Dyson
& Sons, Inc., 72 N.L.R.B. 445, 447 (1947); Scullin Steel Co., 65 N.L.R.B. 1294, 1318
(1946). But cf. National Electric Products Corp., 80 N.L.R.B. 995 (19-8) (unfair labor
practice does not justify no-strike breach).
68. See Daykin, The No-Strike Clause, 11 U. Prr. L. REv. 13, 30-1 (1949). During
World War II, the War Labor Disputes Act, 57 STAT. 163 (1943), 50 U.S.C. Arr. §§ 1501-
15 (1946), provided for thirty days notice of strikes at war plants and for a secret
ballot the thirtieth day. In an overwhelming number of cases, the employees voted with
the union leadership. N.Y. Times, January 12, 1954, p. 9, col. 3.
69. See note 27 supra.
70. During the course of an economic strike, the employer is free to hire as muany
new employees as he wishes. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333
(1.938). See cases cited in P-H LAB. REL. Sitv. 121,136 (1954). A fortiori, he should be
free to hire new employees during the course of a contract-violating strike, as in Marathon
See Fafnir Bearing Co., 73 N.L.R.B. 1008, 1014-16 (1947). However, if the strike was
precipitated by the employer's unfair labor practice, all strikers are entitled to reinstate-
ment. See note 67 supra.
71. See note 43 supra.
72. Several types of lesser-than-discharge penalties have been upheld. See, e.g.,
NLRB v. Dorsey Trailers, Inc., 179 V.2d 589 (5th Cir. 1950) (two week lay-off);
Pacific Tel & Tel. Co., 107 N.L.R.B. No. 301, 33 LAD. REL. REF. MAN. 1433 (1954) (loss
of wages) ; National Electric Products Corp., 80 N.L.R.B. 995 (1948) (suspension
for several days). However, one state court has held that the employer could not invoke
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its majority.73 Furthermore, the employer may recover the losses incurred
because of the strike by suing the union under Section 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act. 4 XWhile employers should not be handicapped
in their use of reasonable strike sanctions, they should not be allowed under
the guise of such sanctions to change their employees' union.
penalties not specified by the contract. See Kennedy .,. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,
25 N.J. Super. 601, 96 A.2d 720, rcv'd on othcr grounds, 29 N.J. Super. OR, 101 A.2d
592 (1953). Accord: Sylvania Electric Products Co., 14 L.w. Ann. RP. 16 (9M)
(employer could discharge illegal strikers under terms of contract, but it could nt suspiend
them for two weeks).
Prentice-Hall advises its employer-subscribers to secure specific lesser-than-diEcharge
penalties in contracts. See P-H UNIoNz CorN'. SERv. Rmp. T 82 (Oct. 19, 1953). Amni.ng
its recommended penalties are loss of bonuses, loss of seniority, and loss of accrued vaca-
tion time.
73. In order to hold a representation election, the employer must be confronted by
claims of recognition from one or more labor organizations; and no election can he de-
manded in the 12-month period subsequent to an election. §§ 9(c) (1) (b), 9(c) (3), 61
STAT. 144 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159 (Supp. 1952).
If, after the strike, the employer has a reasonale doubt as to the existence of a nwjcrity
in the existing union, he may refuse to bargain until an election has been heLd. See cases
cited in P-H LAB. Rri SEuv. ff 21,942-3 (1954). See also NLRB v. Dorsey Trailers,
Inc., 179 F.2d 589 (5th Cir. 1950) (employer may refuse to bargain with union upon
termination of illegal strike until NLRB proves union still represents a majority of
workers).
Recognition of a new union without an election will probably be disallowed. Marathon
Electric Mfg. Corp., 106 N.L.R.B. No. 199, p. 17, 32 L.. Rn. RE..[:. 1645, 1650
(1953).
74. Section 301, 61 STAT. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (Supp. 1952). For an analysis
of Section 301 cases through 1952, see ABA Report, 21 GEo. ,VAsHr. L Rnv. 127, 123-44
(1952).
Rescission of contracts has been held a bar to Section 301 relief on an election of
remedy theory. See Boeing Airplane Co. v. International Association of Macbinists, 91
F. Supp. 596 (W.D. Wash. 1950), aff'd, ISS F.2d 356 (9th Cir.), cert. dcs:icd, 342 U.S.
821 (1951).
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